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Miranda In Custody Determinations:
Mixed Question of Fact and Law
Thompson v. Keohane'
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 1986, Alaska state troopers questioned Carl Thompson
for over two hours at police headquarters without reading him his Miranda2
rights.' The interrogation led to a confession used at trial to convict
Thompson of first degree murder.4
Thompson filed a federal habeas appeal, alleging among other things that
he was "in custody" when the police interrogated him and therefore should
have been read his Miranda rights. Upon review, the United States Supreme
Court announced that federal courts shall not apply a presumption of
correctness when reviewing state court "in custody" determinations for
Miranda purposes.' The Court held that the question of whether a suspect is
"in custody" is a mixed question of fact and law to which the habeas corpus
statute's presumption does not apply.6 This Note explores how the "in
custody" determinationwas historically viewed and addresses the impact of the
Court's holding that it is a "mixed" question of fact and law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Dixie Thompson's body was found by two hunters on September 10,
1986, in a lake near Fairbanks Alaska.7 One day later, Carl Thompson,
Dixie's former husband, responded to an Alaska state trooper's press release
seeking assistance in identifying the body.' Thompson informed authorities
1. 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires suspects
interrogated by the police to be told they have the right to remain silent, that anything
said can and will be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to legal
counsel.
3. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 460.
4. Id
5. Id at 462.
6. Id at 460.
7. Dixie had been stabbed twenty-nine times. Her body was found wrapped in
chains and covered by a bedspread. Id. at 460, 467.
8. Id. at 460.
1
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that Dixie had been missing for over one month and that her description fit the
one given in the press release.9
A subsequent dental examination conclusively proved the identity of
Dixie Thompson's corpse." A few days later state troopers asked Thompson
to come to headquarters to identify some of Dixie's belongings." At the
headquarters, Thompson immediately identified Dixie's belongings, but did
not leave for another two hours. 2 During that time, two unarmed troopers
questioned Thompson in a small interview room and tape-recorded the
session." The troopers did not advise Thompson of his rights under
Miranda,4 but assured him that he was free to leave at any time.' The
troopers also repeatedly informed Thompson that they knew he killed
Dixie.' 6 The questioning resulted in a confession by Thompson that he
killed his ex-wife. 7
A few hours after obtaining the confession, Alaska state troopers arrested
Thompson for the murder of Dixie Thompson.' Thompson's confession
was introduced as evidence in his trial and the jury convicted him of first
degree murder.'9 During the trial, Thompson argued that the confession was
wrongfully obtained because he was not read his Miranda rights.2 However,
the trial court found that Thompson was not "in custody" when he confessed,
and therefore authorities were not required to inform him of his Miranda
rights." The Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed the trial court's decision
and the state supreme court denied review.'
In addition to the state appeals, Thompson challenged his conviction in
federal court by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' Relying on 28




12. Id. at 461.
13. Id.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 461.
16. Id. At one point in the questioning a trooper told Thompson, "See I know
that you did this thing. There's-there's no question in my mind about that. I can see





21. Id. at 461-62.
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applied a presumption of correctness to the state court's "in custody"
determination and denied Thompson's writ. 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision, holding that a state's determination of whether
a defendant is in custody is a question of fact which will be given a
presumption of correctness on review.'
Thompson appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari in order to resolve a conflict among the circuits over applying a
presumption of correctness to state "in custody" determinations.16 In a 7-2
decision, the Court held that state "in custody" determinations are mixed
questions of fact and law to which the presumption of correctness does not
apply,27 thereby allowing a federal court to independently review a state
court's "in custody" determination.28 The Court remanded the case to the
federal district court to reconsider Thompson's federal habeas corpus petition
without applying the presumption of correctness.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Miranda's "In Custody" Requirement
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies during custodial
interrogation. The decision requires police to inform criminal suspects of their
constitutional rights during custodial interrogations3' in order to safeguard
the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege. However, the Miranda decision is
only applicable if the suspect is "interrogated" 2 by police while "in
custody."3
The determination of whether a person is "in custody" is based on an




27. Id. at 465.
28. Id. at 467.
29. Id.
30. See supra note 14.
31. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
32. For a discussion of what constitutes "interrogation," see WAYNE R. LA FAVE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7 (1985).
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78. See also Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct.
1526 (1994), in which the Court held that Miranda warnings are required "only where
there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody."'
Id. at 1528 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
1997]
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in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."34 A court's
"in custody" determination must also include a "totality of circumstances"
overview, which requires a court to consider the variety of facts surrounding
the interrogation, including where the interrogation took place, how many
officers were present, and whether weapons were drawn."5
B. Standard of Review in Habeas Proceedings
In Townsend v. Sain,3 6 the Supreme Court set out guidelines for
determining when a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing for a
habeas petition. In Townsend, a state prisoner filed a petition for habeas
corpus relief and requested an evidentiary hearing in order to show the
unconstitutionality of admitting his pre-trial confession, but the district court
denied his request.37 The Supreme Court held that federal courts have
discretion in granting evidentiary hearings, but are required to grant a
petitioner such a hearing in certain circumstances." The Court enumerated
six such instances.39 Further, the Townsend Court declared that if a
petitioner had received a "full and fair" hearing of the factual issues in state
court, the habeas court should "ordinarily... accept the facts as found" by the
state court.4°
Three years later, Congress amended the federal habeas corpus statute
41
to reflect the Court's decision in Townsend.42  The amended statute now
34. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
35. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32, § 6.6(c), at 320.
36. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
37. Id. at 297.
38. Id. at 313.
39. The six circumstances in which a court is required to hold an evidentiary
hearing are as follows:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. See infra note 43 to compare Townsend's six situations
with the eight exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
40. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
42. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105-06 (1966)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994)).
[Vol. 62
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states that federal habeas courts must presume that state court determinations
of factual issues are correct, unless one of the enumerated exceptions listed in
the statute applies.43 These exceptions are almost identical to the six
circumstances outlined in Townsend." However, it should be noted that the
federal habeas corpus statute does not require evidentiary hearings as set out
in the Townsend decision.4' The federal statute simply mandates that a
presumption of correctness must be applied to state determinations of factual
issues.46
The presumption of correctness required by Section 2254(d) only applies
to a state court's factual findings and is inapplicable to a state court's
conclusions of law. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that questions of
mixed law and fact shall receive independent review by a federal court.47
43. Section 2254(d) provides that:
[Facts] shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish
or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the fact finding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the
State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made . . . is produced as
provided for hereinafter. ...
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
44. See supra note 39.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). See also Andrew A. Jones, Note, Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes and Federal Habeas Corpus Evidentiary Hearings: Has the Court
Deliberately Bypassed Section 2254(d)?, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 171. "Section 2254(d)
... does not expressly address the question of whether a federal evidentiary hearing
is mandatory." "[Section 2254(d)'s] language alone seemingly does not mandate
evidentiary hearings under any circumstance." Id at 179-80.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
47. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 342 (1980) (holding that "mixed determination[s] of law and fact" are not
1997]
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C. Questions of Fact v. Mixed Questions
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that distinguishing issues of fact
from those of law is difficult at best, stating "we yet know of... [no] rule or
principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal
conclusion."48
In Townsend, the Supreme Court explained that factual issues were "facts
in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their
narrators.. ,,49 The Court in Miller v. Fenton5 used Townsend's
reasoning to find that determining the voluntariness of a confession is a legal
issue.5' In Miller, the Court recognized that a finding of "voluntariness"
involved subsidiary factual questions, such as the length of time of an
interrogation and circumstances surrounding a confession. 2 However, the
Court stated that the "ultimate" finding of "voluntariness" was a legal
determination warranting independent review by a federal habeas court
because the determination requires a court to decide, under the totality of the
circumstances, whether the methods used to obtain the confession were
consistent with constitutional requirements. 3
The Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint defined mixed
questions of law and fact as "those in which the historical facts are admitted
or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is... whether the
rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated."5'4 Other
Supreme Court decisions held that the presumption of correctness does not
subject to section 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 309 n.6 (1963) (holding that "[S]o-called mixed questions of fact and law, which
require the application of a legal standard to the historical fact determinations... are
not facts in this sense.").
48. Pullman-Standard v. Swint 456 U.S. 273,288 (1982). The Court also noted
"the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law."
Id For a commentary on the fact/law distinction, see generally Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985).
49. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 n.6.
50. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
51. Id at 111-112.
52. Id at 117. The Court held that the presumption of correctness in Section
2254(d) would be applied to these factual findings. Id.
53. Id
54. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
[Vol. 62
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apply to mixed questions of fact and law,"5 allowing federal habeas courts
to independently review them. 6
Until the Court's decision in Thompson, federal appellate courts disagreed
on whether a state court "in custody" determination was a question of fact or
a mixed question of fact and law. 7 As a result, the outcomes of cases with
strikingly similar facts differed sharply.
Some federal appellate courts, such as the Eighth Circuit, had held that
"in custody" determinations are factual issues to which the Section 2254(d)
presumption of correctness would apply. In Feltrop v. Delo, a Missouri
jury convicted Feltrop of capital murder in 1988.5" At trial, prosecutors used
a confession made by Feltrop during a meeting with police in a tiny room at
the county sheriff's office.' Feltrop argued that he should have been read
his Miranda rights before police questioned him.6' The Missouri trial and
appellate courts rejected his argument, finding that he was not in custody and
the police had no obligation to read him his Miranda rights.62 Feltrop filed
a petition for habeas relief, but his petition was denied.63 Applying Section
2254(d), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
held that the state court's finding was entitled to a presumption of
correctness.' The Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating that the test for
determining custody is an objective one which focuses on whether the
defendant's freedom of movement was restrained, and that Feltrop did not
overcome the presumption that he was not in custody.65
55. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331,
2379 (1993). "[S]ection 2254(d) has always been understood to be inapplicable to
questions at the intersection of primary facts and legal principles." Id.
56. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 304 (1963), overruledon other grounds
by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
57. For example, the Eighth Circuit had applied a presumption of correctness to
state "in custody" determinations while the Eleventh Circuit independently reviewed
these determinations. See generally Feltrop v. Delo, 46 F.3d 766, 772 (8th Cir. 1995),
overruled on other grounds Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995); Jacobs v.
Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1291 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
58. Feltrop v. Delo, 46 F.3d 766, 772 (8th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 768.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 772.
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The Eleventh Circuit however, held that state "in custody" determinations
were mixed questions of fact and law.66  As in Feltrop, in Jacobs v.
Singletary, police questioned defendant Jacobs without reading her the
Miranda rights.67 Jacobs made incriminating statements to police that were
admitted at trial to support her conviction for first degree murder.6 ' The
Florida state appellate courts affirmed her conviction, and she filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was in custody when the police
questioned her and that she should have been read her Miranda rights.69 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied her
petition, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed.7" The Eleventh Circuit held that
the state court's "in custody" determination was a mixed finding of law and
fact, and therefore, the issue could be independently reviewed by a federal
habeas court.7' In reviewing the application of the law to the facts, the
Eleventh Circuit found that Jacobs was in custody when police questioned her,
and that admitting her confession at trial constituted reversible error.72
The difference among the circuits in labeling "in custody" as a mixed or
factual question resulted in disparate treatment of criminal defendants."
Some defendants received a federal review of the state court's finding and
even obtained new trials, while others under similar facts made similar
arguments and had their convictions affirmed based on a presumption that the
state court got it right.74 The Supreme Court recognized that the federal
habeas corpus statute should be applied uniformly throughout the country and




In Thompson, the Court discussed Section 2254(d) of the habeas corpus
statute which requires federal courts to apply a presumption of correctness to




70. Id at 1296.
71. Id at 1291.
72. Id. at 1291, 1295.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
75. Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 462 (1995).
[Vol. 62
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state court determinations of factual issues.76 The Court declared that a state
court's determination of whether or not a defendant was "in custody" was a
mixed question of fact and law, warranting independent review by a federal
habeas court.77
The Court first discussed the Townsend decision, noting that while it
advised habeas courts to accept the facts as found by state courts, the decision
also found that mixed questions of fact and law were not "facts" that a habeas
court should accept as correct.78 The Court relied on the Townsend finding
that facts are ". . . a recital of external events and the credibility of their
narrators."79 Further the Court noted the Miller finding that questions
requiring a consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" were questions
for independent federal determination8"
The Court observed that the Alaska trial court used a totality of the
circumstances assessment in determining that Thompson was not in
custody." The test the trial court used for making an "in custody"
determination was whether a reasonable person would feel he was not free to
leave and break off police questioning.82 The Court stated that the trial
court's decision that Thompson was not in custody turned on the facts that the
police told Thompson he was free to go, that he was not formally arrested at
the time of questioning, and that the troopers were unarmed. 3 The trial
court weighed these facts and decided under the "totality of the
circumstances," a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, but
observed that the question was "very close."84
Next, the Court stated that, historically, issues raised on habeas appeal
were categorized as issues of fact or law, but noted that this determination was
"sometimes slippery."8" In past decisions the Court had held that factual
questions included the issues of juror impartiality and a defendant's
competency to stand trial. 6 The Court noted that the resolution of these
76. Id. at 460.
77. Id at 465.
78. Id. at 463-64. The Court noted that section 2254(d) basically elevated the
Townsend Court's view into a presumption of correctness. Id
79. Id. at 464.
80. Id. See also notes 51-54 and accompanying text.




85. Id at 464. The Court in Wainwright v. Witt noted that "[ilt will not always
be easy to separate questions of 'fact' from 'mixed questions of law and fact' for
§ 2254(d) purposes.. ." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985).
86. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 464.
1997]
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issues turned on basic historical facts as well as the trial judge's opinion of the
witness's demeanor and credibility.87 Further, the Court reasoned that since
a trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
evaluate their credibility, a trial court's findings should be given presumptive
weight.88
Issues which the Court has decided are legal questions include the
voluntariness of a confession and the effectiveness of counsel.89 The Court
stated that these issues contained factual components or "what happened"
issues which warranted a presumption of correctness.90 However, the Court
stated that Miller counseled that "ultimate question[s]" were not within the
scope of the Section 2254(d) presumption because of their "uniquely legal
dimension."'
Next, the Court found that the determination of whether a defendant is
"in custody" involves two separate inquiries.' The first is "what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" and the second is "given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." '93 The Court decided that
the first inquiry is strictly factual, but the second inquiry involves the
application of a legal standard. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
"ultimate determination" of the second inquiry presented a "mixed question of
law and fact" which qualifies for independent review.94
The Court stated that reasoning that the "trial court is in the best position"
(which is used in factual issues such as finding juror bias and competency to
stand trial issues) is not a relevant factor in determining whether "in custody"
is a question of fact.95 The Court said that issues of juror bias and
competency involve credibility determinations which sometimes contribute to
the historical facts.96 In contrast, the "in custody" determination depends on
an analysis of whether under Miranda a "reasonable person" in the defendant's
shoes would have been in custody, and this determination does not depend on
87. Id. at 465.
88. Id. The Court also stated that the trial court's "predominate function in
determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily







95. Id. The Court stated that "[a]s this case illustrates, the trial court's superior
capacity to resolve credibility issues is not dispositive of the 'in custody' inquiry." Id
96. Id. at 465-66.
[Vol. 62
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the demeanor or credibility of witnesses. Further, the Court stated that a
trial court's findings of juror bias or a defendant's competency to stand trial
were unlikely to have precedential value, while "in custody" findings guide
future decisions.98 The Court concluded that a state court is not in a better
position than a federal court in making the ultimate determination of whether
the facts found were consistent with Miranda."
Finally, the Court stated that allowing habeas courts to independently
review state "in custody" determinations would protect the right against self-
incrimination.' In addition, the Court said that its decision may unify
precedent and stabilize the law.'' The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment and remanded petitioner Thompson's case for further
proceedings. 2
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent agreed with the majority's conclusion that a legal standard
should be applied in determining custody for Miranda purposes. 3
However, the dissent argued that the Townsend decision's distinction between
issues of fact and mixed issues is not relevant in this case."° The dissent
stated that, since the custody issue fell somewhere between issues of fact and
law, the Court should have decided "as a matter of the sound administration
of justice, [which] judicial actor is better positioned.. . to decide the issue.
•..,"0' The dissent asserted that the "in custody" determination was "fact-
laden" and that the trial judge is better suited to make such a determination
because complex, diverse, and case-specific factors must be considered in
order to make an overall assessment of custody. 6  In support of this
argument, the dissent pointed out that trial judges draw inferences from the
97. Id. at 466. The Court analogized "custody" determinations to determinations
of voluntariness, stating that "assessments of credibility and demeanor are not crucial
to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of 'voluntariness."' Id (citing Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1985)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id at 467.
101. Id The Court declared that "as our decisions bear out, the law declaration
aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and
stabilize the law." Id
102. Id.
103. Id at 467-68 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 468.
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evidence, often take live testimony, assess the demeanor of relevant persons,
and consider the length, location and nature of the interrogation.0 7
The dissent also agreed with the majority's view that the assessment of
whether a "reasonable man in the suspect's shoes" is in custody contains
objective components.0 8 However, the dissent stated that making this
finding contains many important factbound assessments which should not "go
out the window" when a court is making the "ultimate inquiry."' 9 Further,
the dissent stated that federal habeas courts are inferior in making this
assessment because often the habeas court must review the state court's record
several years after the trial, and many of the subtleties of the trial judge's
opinion are not reflected in the record."0
In addition, the dissent pointed out that state courts are qualified to
determine constitutional questions and are presumed to apply federal law as
faithfully as federal courts."' The dissent stated that the majority's decision
"insults our colleagues in the States" because it implies that state judges are
not competent or reliable enough to decide whether a defendant was "in
custody" for Miranda purposes." 2
Finally, the dissent stated that there was no reason to remand the case,
because Thompson could not be in custody since he went to the station
voluntarily and was not arrested."3 The dissent concluded that even under
de novo review, Thompson would not be able to establish a Miranda violation
and therefore Alaska should be spared the uncertainty and expense of
defending the conviction of a confessed murderer.'"4
V. COMMENT
The Thompson Court properly reasoned that the ultimate determination
of custody involved an application of the law to the facts found by the trial
court and therefore labeled the issue a "mixed question of law and fact.""'




110. Id. at 469.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The dissent pointed out that the Court in California v. Beheler held a
person is not in custody if "the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes
to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief
interview." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121 (1983).
114. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. 457, 470 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
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the purposes of Section 2254(d) has been tricky." 6 The Court also used
precedent as an aid in reaching its decision," 7 as it had labeled other issues
involving the application of a "reasonable person" standard as questions of law
or mixed questions."' In addition, past Supreme Court decisions treated "in
custody" as a legal question in deciding the propriety of state expansion of the
meaning of "custodial interrogation.""' 9
One commentator suggests that often the determination of whether an
issue is of fact, law, or mixed is made by first deciding whether the state or
federal court would be better suited to resolve the particular issue and then
labeling it accordingly.' Under this method, the outcome of Thompson
would remain the same because federal courts are better suited to resolve the
"in custody" issue since they can advance uniform outcomes in Miranda
violations cases.' In addition, because of the institutional differences
between them, state courts are not as equally competent as federal courts in
the resolution of constitutional issues.'2
Another important value advanced by allowing federal courts to
independently review state court findings of "in custody" is the reduction of
possible bias at the state court level. In the Thompson dissent, Justice Thomas
argued that one should presume that state judges apply federal law as
faithfully as federal judges."z However, state judges often face a variety of
political pressures, while federal judges enjoy life tenure, insulating them from
such pressure. 4
Many commentators have advocated limiting the scope of habeas review
by arguing that habeas review of too many issues often allows guilty criminals
to go free.2 5 Justice Thomas's dissent in Thompson appeared to agree with
116. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
117. Many past decisions indicate that Miranda issues were questions of law.
See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
118. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 467.
119. Id at 467. The Court stated, "It would be anomalous to type the question
differently when an individual complains that the state courts had erroneously
constricted the circumstances that add up to an 'in custody' conclusion." Id.
120. Monaghan, supra note 48, at 237.
121. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 466.
122. See generally Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1977). In his article Professor Neubome criticizes the assumption that state and
federal courts can equally decide federal constitutional issues.
123. Id. at 468.
124. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 92 (1984).
125. See Carole J. Yanofsky, Note, Winthrow v. Williams: The Supreme Court's
SurprisingRefusal to Stone Miranda, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 331 (1994). At common
1997]
13
Kherdekar: Kherdekar: Miranda in Custody Determinations: Mixed Question of Fact and Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
this view and argued that a state should not have to bear the expense of re-
trying a confessed murderer. 26 Cost, however, is not a valid reason to limit
the amount of process a criminal defendant receives. Currently the law
provides that the due process to which a criminal defendant is entitled includes
the opportunity to have legal or mixed claims independently reviewed by a
federal court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Thompson, the Supreme Court resolved an inter-circuit conflict as to
the standard of review a habeas court shall apply in reviewing state "in
custody" determinations." 7 The habeas corpus statute provides that habeas
courts must extend a presumption of correctness to state court factual
determinations.' The Court held that a finding of "in custody" calls for a
court to apply a legal standard to historical facts, rendering the question a
mixed one of fact and law to which the presumption of correctness does not
apply. 29 As a result of Thompson, federal courts will be able to define the
"in custody" aspect of Miranda, which should foster uniformity in the
application of Miranda nationwide and provide proper protection to criminal
defendants seeking habeas review in federal court.
AVANI S. KHERDEKAR
law habeas review was limited to jurisdictional claims and many conservative scholars
would like to see that limitation in place today. The Supreme Court has limited
certain habeas claims but has refused to limit constitutional claims. Id.
126. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 470.
127. Id. at 462.
128. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 28.
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